Terry v. Ohio
http://dbpedia.org/resource/Terry_v._Ohio an entity of type: Thing
El Caso Terry contra Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), fue un litigio ante la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos que falló que la prohibición de búsqueda no razonable establecida en la Cuarta Enmienda no se violaba cuando un oficial de policía detiene a un sospechoso en la calle y le realiza un registro de su persona sin una causa probable.
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The Court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the p
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Caso Terry contra Ohio
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Terry v. Ohio
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John W. Terry v. State of Ohio
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1967
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Terry v. Ohio,
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1968
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John W. Terry v. State of Ohio
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Police may stop a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may frisk the suspect for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, without violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.
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Terry v. Ohio
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Warren
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 .
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 .
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If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances. But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
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El Caso Terry contra Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), fue un litigio ante la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos que falló que la prohibición de búsqueda no razonable establecida en la Cuarta Enmienda no se violaba cuando un oficial de policía detiene a un sospechoso en la calle y le realiza un registro de su persona sin una causa probable. Debido al importante interés en la protección de la seguridad de un oficial de policía, la Corte sostuvo que la policía tenía la facultad de detener a una persona y realizar una rápida inspección superficial de su vestimenta con el objetivo de buscar armas. Esto está permitido si el oficial tiene una sospecha razonable de que un crimen tuvo o va a tener lugar, y la persona detenida esta armada y es peligrosa. Esta sospecha razonable debe estar basada en hechos específicos y no solamente en una corazonada del oficial. Esta acción permitida a la policía ha sido, en consecuencia de este caso, referida como “detención y pesquisa de Terry” "Terry stop and frisk", o simplemente “detención Terry”. El estándar Terry fue luego extendido para las detenciones temporales de personas en vehículos, conocida como “detención de tráfico” (traffic stops). El raciocinio detrás de la decisión de la Corte Suprema discurría sobre la base, como la opinión señala, “la regla excluyente tiene sus limitaciones” ("the exclusionary rule has its limitations"). El significado de la regla es para proteger a las personas de búsquedas no razonables que apuntan a buscar evidencia, no a búsquedas por otros propósitos (como la prevención de un crimen o la protección de un oficial de policía)
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The Court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch. This permitted police action has subsequently been referred to in short as a "stop and frisk", "stop, question, and frisk," or simply a "Terry stop." The Terry standard was later extended to temporary detentions of persons in vehicles, known as traffic stops; see Terry stop for a summary of subsequent jurisprudence. The rationale behind the Supreme Court decision revolves around the notion that, as the opinion argues, "the exclusionary rule has its limitations." According to the Court, the meaning of the rule is to protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at gathering evidence, not searches and seizures for other purposes (like prevention of crime or personal protection of police officers).
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24006
