Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder

rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder

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rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Eric Holder, Attorney General

rdf:langString Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito

rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,

rdf:langString The doctrine of constitutional avoidance factors heavily in the Court's conclusion that appellant is eligible for bailout as a "political subdivision" under §4 of the VRA. See ante, at 11. Regardless of the Court's resolution of the statutory question, I am in full agreement that this case raises serious questions concerning the constitutionality of §5 of the VRA. But, unlike the Court, I do not believe that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is applicable here. The ultimate relief sought in this case is not bailout eligibility--it is bailout itself. See First Amended Complaint in No. 06-1384 , p. 8, Record, Doc. 83 . Eligibility for bailout turns on the statutory question addressed by the Court--the proper definition of "political subdivision" in the bailout clauses of §4 of the VRA. Entitlement to bailout, however, requires a covered "political subdivision" to submit substantial evidence indicating that it is not engaging in "discrimination in voting on account of race," see 42 U. S. C. §1973b. The Court properly declines to give appellant bailout because appellant has not yet proved its compliance with the statutory requirements for such relief. See §§1973b-. In fact, the record below shows that appellant's factual entitlement to bailout is a vigorously contested issue. See, e.g., NAACP's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in No. 06-1384 , pp. 490-492, Record, Doc. 100; Attorney General's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in No. 06-1384 , ¶¶19, 59, Record, Doc. 98. Given its resolution of the statutory question, the Court has thus correctly remanded the case for resolution of appellant's factual entitlement to bailout. See ante, at 16. But because the Court is not in a position to award appellant bailout, adjudication of the constitutionality of §5, in my view, cannot be avoided. "Traditionally, the avoidance canon was not a doctrine under which courts read statutes to avoid mere constitutional doubts. Instead, it commanded courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute--one constitutional and the other unconstitutional--to choose the constitutional reading." Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 395 . To the extent that constitutional avoidance is a worthwhile tool of statutory construction, it is because it allows a court to dispose of an entire case on grounds that do not require the court to pass on a statute's constitutionality. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 ; see also, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U. S. 605, 629 . The doctrine "avoids decision of constitutional questions where possible, and it permits one lawsuit, rather than two, to resolve the entire controversy." C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts §19, p. 104 . Absent a determination that appellant is not just eligible for bailout, but is entitled to it, this case will not have been entirely disposed of on a nonconstitutional ground. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 . Invocation of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is therefore inappropriate in this case. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is also unavailable here because an interpretation of §4 that merely makes more political subdivisions eligible for bailout does not render §5 constitutional and the Court notably does not suggest otherwise. See Clark, supra, at 396 . Bailout eligibility is a distant prospect for most covered jurisdictions. To obtain bailout a covered jurisdiction must satisfy numerous objective criteria. It must show that during the previous 10 years: no "test or device has been used within such State or political subdivision for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color"; "no final judgment of any court of the United States ... has determined that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account of race or color have occurred anywhere in the territory of" the covered jurisdiction; "no Federal examiners or observers ... have been assigned to" the covered jurisdiction; the covered jurisdiction has fully complied with §5; and "the Attorney General has not interposed any objection and no declaratory judgment has been denied under [§5]." §§1973b-. The jurisdiction also has the burden of presenting "evidence of minority participation, including evidence of the levels of minority group registration and voting, changes in such levels over time, and disparities between minority-group and non-minority-group participation." §1973b. These extensive requirements may be difficult to satisfy, see Brief for Georgia Governor Sonny Purdue as Amicus Curiae 20-26, but at least they are objective. The covered jurisdiction seeking bailout must also meet subjective criteria: it must " have eliminated voting procedures and methods of election which inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process; have engaged in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of persons exercising rights protected [under the Act]; and have engaged in other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age and the appointment of minority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election and registration process." §§1973b-. As a result, a covered jurisdiction meeting each of the objective conditions could nonetheless be denied bailout because it has not, in the subjective view of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, engaged in sufficiently "constructive efforts" to expand voting opportunities, §1973b. Congress, of course, has complete authority to set the terms of bailout. But its promise of a bailout opportunity has, in the great majority of cases, turned out to be no more than a mirage. As the Court notes, only a handful "of the more than 12,000 covered political subdivisions ... have successfully bailed out of the Act." Ante, at 16;1 see Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 1, 42 . Accordingly, bailout eligibility does not eliminate the issue of §5's constitutionality.

rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Eric Holder, Attorney General

rdf:langString Dissent Part I

rdf:langString Dissent Part II

rdf:langString Text of Section I

rdf:langString Text of Section II

rdf:langString Text of Section III

rdf:langString Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 stands, but districts should be better able to "bail out" of it per Section 4.

rdf:langString force

rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder

rdf:langString Roberts

rdf:langString Supreme Court

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rdf:langString Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and in particular its requirement that proposed electoral-law changes in certain states must be approved by the federal government. In a 9–0 decision, the Court concluded that the district was eligible to apply for an exemption (bailout) from this section per Section 4(a), because the definition of "political subdivision" in Section 14(c)(2) included a district of this nature. In an 8–1 opinion, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of that provision, citing the principle of constitutional avoidance.

rdf:langString Thomas