Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

rdf:langString Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

rdf:langString Political map of the disputed Kashmir region, showing the Indian-administered Kashmir Valley or Vale of Kashmir from which a large proportion of Hindus have migrated out

rdf:langString March 2022

rdf:langString Early 1990.

rdf:langString * 30–80 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by insurgents by mid-year 1990 when the exodus was largely complete, according to several scholars. * Indian Home Ministry data records 217 Hindus civilians fatalities during the four-year period, 1988 to 1991; another scholar estimates 228 Pandit civilian fatalities. Government of Jammu and Kashmir recorded 219 Pandit fatalities between 1989 and 2004.

rdf:langString WP:NEWSORG are only reliable for news

rdf:langString * 90,000–100,000 Pandits of an estimated population of 120,000–140,000 fled the Valley between January and March 1990, according to several scholarly estimates. * Other scholars have suggested a higher figure of approximately 150,000 for the exodus.

rdf:langString Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

rdf:langString The Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, or Pandits, is their early-1990 migration, or flight, from the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley in Indian-administered Kashmir following rising violence in an insurgency. Of a total Pandit population of 120,000–140,000 some 90,000-100,000 left the valley or felt compelled to leave, and about 30 were killed. During the period of substantial migration, the insurgency was being led by a group calling for a secular and independent Kashmir, but there were also growing Islamist factions envisioning an Islamic state. Although their numbers of dead and injured were low, the Pandits, who believed that Kashmir's culture was tied to India's, experienced fear and panic set off by targeted killings of some high-profile officials among their ranks and public calls for independence among the insurgents. The accompanying rumours and uncertainty together with the absence of guarantees for their safety by India's federal government might have been the latent causes of the exodus. The descriptions of the violence as "genocide" or "ethnic cleansing" in some Hindu nationalist publications or among suspicions voiced by some exiled Pandits are widely considered inaccurate, aggressive, or propaganda by scholars. The Kashmir Valley, which is a part of the larger Kashmir region that has been the subject of a dispute between India and Pakistan from 1947, has been administered by India from approximately the same time. Before 1947, during the period of British Raj in India when Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state, Kashmiri Pandits, or Kashmiri Hindus, had stably constituted between 4% and 6% of the population of the Kashmir valley in censuses from 1889 to 1941; the remaining 94 to 95% of the population was Kashmiri Muslim. By 1950, a large number of Pandits—whose elite owned over 30% of the arable land in the Valley—moved to other parts of India in the face of land reforms planned by the incoming administration of Sheikh Abdullah, the threat of socio-economic decline, and the unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India. In 1989 a persisting insurgency began in Kashmir. It was fed by Kashmiri dissatisfaction with India's federal government over rigging an assembly election in 1987 and disavowing a promise of greater autonomy. The dissatisfaction overflowed into an ill-defined uprising against the Indian state. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), an organization that had generally secular antecedents and the predominant goal of political independence, led the uprising but did not abjure violence. In early 1990, the vast majority of Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley in a mass-migration. More of them left in the following years so that, by 2011, only around 3,000 families remained. 30 or 32 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by insurgents by mid-March 1990 when the exodus was largely complete, according to some scholars. Indian Home Ministry data records 217 Hindu civilian fatalities during the four-year period, 1988 to 1991. The reasons for this migration are vigorously contested. In 1989–1990, as calls by Kashmiri Muslims for independence from India gathered pace, many Kashmiri Pandits, who viewed self-determination to be anti-national, felt under pressure. The killings in the 1990s of a number of Pandit officials, may have shaken the community's sense of security, although it is thought some Pandits—by virtue of their evidence given later in Indian courts—may have acted as agents of the Indian state. The Pandits killed in targeted assassinations by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) included some high-profile ones. Occasional anti Hindu calls were made from mosques on loudspeakers asking Pandits to leave the valley. News of threatening letters created fear, though in later interviews the letters were seen to have been sparingly received. There were disparities between the accounts of the two communities, the Muslims and the Pandits. Many Kashmiri Pandits believed they were forced out of the Valley either by Pakistan and the militants it supported or the Kashmiri Muslims as a group. Many Kashmiri Muslims did not support violence against religious minorities; the departure of the Kashmiri Pandits offered an excuse for casting Kashmiri Muslims as Islamic radicals, thereby contaminating their more genuine political grievances, and offering a rationale for their surveillance and violent treatment by the Indian state. Many Muslims in the Valley believed that the then Governor, Jagmohan had encouraged the Pandits to leave so as to have a free hand in more thoroughly pursuing reprisals against Muslims. Several scholarly views chalk the migration to genuine panic among the Pandits that stemmed as much from the religious vehemence among some of the insurgents as by the absence of guarantees for the Pandits' safety issued by the Governor. Kashmiri Pandits initially moved to the Jammu Division, the southern half of Jammu and Kashmir, where they lived in refugee camps, sometimes in unkempt and unclean surroundings. At the time of their exodus, very few Pandits expected their exile to last beyond a few months. As the exile lasted longer, many displaced Pandits who were in the urban elite were able to find jobs in other parts of India, but those in the lower-middle-class, especially those from rural areas languished longer in refugee camps, with some living in poverty; this generated tensions with the host communities—whose social and religious practices, although Hindu, differed from those of the brahmin Pandits—and rendered assimilation more difficult. Many displaced Pandits in the camps succumbed to emotional depression and a sense of helplessness. The cause of the Kashmiri Pandits was quickly championed by right-wing Hindu groups in India, which also preyed on their insecurities and further alienated them from Kashmiri Muslims. Some displaced Kashmiri Pandits have formed an organization called Panun Kashmir ("Our own Kashmir"), which has asked for a separate homeland for Kashmiri Hindus in the Valley but has opposed autonomy for Kashmir on the grounds that it would promote the formation of an Islamic state. The return to the homeland in Kashmir also constitutes one of the main points of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party's election platform. Kashmiri Pandits in exile have written autobiographical memoirs, novels, and poetry to record their experiences and to understand them. 19 January is observed by the Kashmiri Hindu communities as Exodus Day.