Constitutional hardball

rdf:langString Constitutional hardball

rdf:langString Constitutional hardball is the exploitation of procedures, laws and institutions by political actors for partisan gain in ways which violate pre-established norms and push the bounds of legality. Legal scholars and political scientists have characterized constitutional hardball as a threat to democracy, because it undermines shared understanding of democratic norms and undermines the expectation that the other side will comply with democratic norms. As a result, the use of constitutional hardball by one side of partisans encourages other partisans to respond in similar fashion. The concept stems from a 2004 article by Mark Tushnet of Harvard Law School. Harvard University political scientists Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky have argued that democracies such as Argentina and Venezuela shifted to authoritarianism in part through constitutional hardball, as Juan Perón and Hugo Chavez used legal court-packing schemes to cement power.