Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.

rdf:langString Rehearing denied, .

rdf:langString Burger, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell

rdf:langString Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 ; 40 C.F.R. 51.18-

rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.

rdf:langString Courts must defer to administrative agency interpretations of the authority granted to them by Congress where the intent of Congress was ambiguous and where the interpretation was reasonable or permissible.

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rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council

rdf:langString Stevens

rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, .

rdf:langString First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

rdf:langString Chevron Two-Step Music Video

rdf:langString Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), was a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court set forth the legal test for determining whether to grant deference to a government agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers. The decision articulated a doctrine now known as "Chevron deference". The doctrine consists of a two-part test applied by the court, when appropriate, that is highly deferential to government agencies: "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction [emphasis added] of the statute", so long as Congress has not spoken directly to the precise issue at question. The decision involved a lawsuit challenging the U.S. government's interpretation of the word "source" in an environmental statute. In 1977, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that amended the Clean Air Act of 1963—the United States's comprehensive law regulating air pollution. The bill changed the law so that all companies in the United States that planned to build or install any major source of air pollutants were required to go through an elaborate "new-source review" process before they could proceed. The bill did not precisely define what constituted a "source" of air pollutants, and so the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) formulated a definition as part of implementing the changes to the law. The EPA's initial definition of a "source" of air pollutants covered essentially any significant change or addition to a plant or factory, but in 1981 it changed its definition to be simply a plant or factory in its entirety. This allowed companies to avoid the "new-source review" process entirely if, when increasing their plant's emissions through building or modifying, they simultaneously modified other parts of their plant to reduce emissions so that the overall change in the plant's emissions was zero. The Natural Resources Defense Council, an American non-profit environmental advocacy organization, then filed and ultimately lost a lawsuit challenging the legality of the EPA's new definition. Chevron is one of the most important decisions in U.S. administrative law, and has been cited in thousands of cases since being issued in 1984.

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