Slaughter-House Cases

rdf:langString Slaughter-House Cases

rdf:langString

rdf:langString Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J. P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William Fagan, J. D. Broderick, N. Seibel, M. Lannes, J. Gitzinger, J. P. Aycock, D. Verges, The Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. The State of Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General;

rdf:langString The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company;

rdf:langString The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company

rdf:langString Bradley

rdf:langString Field

rdf:langString Swayne

rdf:langString Chase, Swayne, Bradley

rdf:langString Clifford, Davis, Strong, Hunt

rdf:langString U.S. Const. Art. IV. sec. 2, 13th, 14th, 15th Amendments

rdf:langString Error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana

rdf:langString right

rdf:langString John Archibald Campbell, the lawyer who argued for the butchers

rdf:langString Matthew H. Carpenter, the lawyer who argued for Louisiana

rdf:langString Slaughter-House Cases,

rdf:langString horizontal

rdf:langString Justices Stephen J. Field , Joseph P. Bradley , and Noah H. Swayne , the authors of the dissenting opinions in Slaughter-House

rdf:langString Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J. P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William Fagan, J. D. Broderick, N. Seibel, M. Lannes, J. Gitzinger, J. P. Aycock, D. Verges, The Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. The State of Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General;

rdf:langString The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company;

rdf:langString The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company

rdf:langString The Fourteenth Amendment only protects the privileges and immunities pertaining to citizenship of the United States, not those that pertain to state citizenship.

rdf:langString Noah Haynes Swayne, photo, head and shoulders, seated.jpg

rdf:langString JACampbell.jpg

rdf:langString Joseph Philo Bradley - Brady-Handy.jpg

rdf:langString Matthew_H._Carpenter_-_Brady-Handy.jpg

rdf:langString Stephen Johnson Field, photo half length seated, 1875.jpg

rdf:langString Slaughter-House Cases

rdf:langString Miller

rdf:langString Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 129 .

rdf:langString Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.

rdf:langString [O]n the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.

rdf:langString It is objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known and the measure deliberately adopted. ... It is necessary to enable the government of the nation to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact all are entitled to enjoy. Without such authority, any government claiming to be national is glaringly defective.

rdf:langString The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision consolidating several cases that held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only protects the legal rights that are associated with federal U.S. citizenship, not those that pertain to state citizenship. Though the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases minimized the impact of the Privileges or Immunities Clause on state law, the Supreme Court would later incorporate the Bill of Rights to strike down state laws on the basis of other clauses. In 2010 the Court rejected argument in McDonald v. Chicago to overrule the established precedent of Slaughterhouse and decided instead to incorporate the Second Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment. Seeking to improve sanitary conditions, the Louisiana legislature and the city of New Orleans had established a corporation charged with regulating the slaughterhouse industry. Members of the Butchers' Benevolent Association challenged the constitutionality of the corporation, claiming that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment had been ratified in the aftermath of the American Civil War with the primary intention of protecting civil rights of millions of newly emancipated freedmen in the Southern United States, but the butchers argued that the amendment protected their right to "sustain their lives through labor". In the majority opinion written by Associate Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, the Court held to a narrower interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment than the plaintiffs urged, ruling that it did not restrict the police powers exercised by Louisiana because the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only those rights guaranteed by the United States, not individual states. In effect, the clause was interpreted to convey limited protection pertinent to a small minority of rights, such as the right to seek federal office. In a dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Stephen J. Field wrote that Miller's opinion effectively rendered the Fourteenth Amendment a "vain and idle enactment".