Hunter v Moss

rdf:langString Hunter v Moss

rdf:langString Hunter v Moss

rdf:langString [1993] EWCA Civ 11, [1994] 1 WLR 452

rdf:langString Dillon LJ, Mann LJ and Hirst LJ

rdf:langString Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 is an English trusts law case from the Court of Appeal concerning the certainty of subject matter necessary to form a trust. Moss promised Hunter 50 shares in his company as part of an employment contract, but failed to provide them. Hunter brought a claim against Moss for them, arguing that Moss's promise had created a trust over those 50 shares. The constitution of trusts normally requires that trust property be segregated from non-trust property for the trust to be valid, as in Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd. On this occasion, however, both Colin Rimer in the High Court of Justice and Dillon, Mann and Hirst LJJ in the Court of Appeal felt that, because this case dealt with intangible rather than tangible property, this rule did not have to be applied. Because all the shares were identical, it did not matter that they were not segregated, and the trust was valid. The decision was applied in Re Harvard Securities, creating a rule that segregation is not always necessary when the trust concerns intangible, identical property. The academic reaction to Hunter was mixed. While some called it "fair, sensible and workable", or noted that "Logically the decision in Hunter v Moss appears a sensible one", Alastair Hudson felt that "doctrinally, it is suggested that the decision in Hunter v Moss is wrong and should not be relied upon", because it contradicted existing property law and drew a distinction between tangible and intangible property he felt to be "spurious".

rdf:langString [1993] 1 WLR 934